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I promised that I've allowed so little time for discussion in the last several classes that this seemed like a good night and I hope that the people who had questions that you've been sitting on for a while have brought them with you tonight to this place. So I really am open to questions. I think... Give some thought to what might be of interest to other people. But don't hold back criticism if you really feel very frustrated, or very puzzled about anything, very negative about anything. Feel free, the floor is yours. Maybe it would help if you all talked loudly so that I don't have to repeat the question.

Q:

Are you relating now the nuclear planning of the postwar era to the strategic bombing of WW II because these are two different eras?

Q:

I think you are talking about the problem now... ..of what the target in the nuclear era... Maybe I should take, by the way, a few questions at a time and see how they fit together so we'll make sure we get... In fact I'll try to write some of these down. Can someone give me a piece of paper? Let me take a couple of others. Maybe it could help if people... so I'll get a sense of what I want to cover and I don't spend too much time on one thing. How about some other questions, before I answer one? I saw a hand in the back a minute ago. Yes?

Q:

The which? I'm sorry.

Q:

Oh, it ended very well. We stopped the arms race actually. For half an hour. Part of it. That's more than any president can say lately. So it was satisfying. We arrested the arms race. Go and do likewise. We can get back to that though. I don't mean to brush that off. But let's start with questions on the course.

Q:

To create a... How would you put it?

Q:

That's a very good question. I can see how... what I... Could you hear the question? OK, well we'll come back to it and I'll repeat it briefly here. I described a possible policy of threatening by creating a deliberately unstable situation. Threatening—actually rocking a rowboat (which is Tom Shelling's metaphor in his book Arms and Influence)—and saying in effect, "If you don't stop what you're doing or if you don't do what I want, this boat may tip over." And they make the threat credible

by creating a situation in which, if it persists, may in fact result in the boat tipping over. And showing your own willingness to impose that risk and to take that risk by actually doing it. Question: Has this been a conscious policy of all of our presidents? And the question is raised by the fact that I described Eisenhower in the late fifties as having done something that actually created an unstable situation by delegating authority to lower levels and pointed out that this was done by Kennedy and Johnson after him. The question then is: Am I saying that every president has consciously tried to create an unstable situation? And as I say that is... a quick answer will be (although that is suggested by the example that I gave, and which you cite on this delegation question) I would say the answer is no. And the explanation for what they did is different. I would say it's not that they were trying (at that time) to create an unstable situation. But I think that raises the question as to what they were doing, and why they acted as if they were willing to create an unstable situation. Let me come back to that. It's a very interesting point. Any others? I saw some hands, you had... over here.

Q:

You know, it's funny. I've had related questions quite a bit like that in the last 13 years now and I've never had that exact one. Why with my change of mind did I not stay in and do what I could? Very interesting question. Let me come back to that. Let me think up an answer, right?

No, I know pretty well why I didn't stay in. Good. These are very good questions. Great. We are going well here. Wait, let's get somebody else and then we'll come back. Let me take 5 or 6 and then see where we go. No others?

Q:

Good. OK. Let's address that. What do you think?

Q: Yeah.

You in the Marine Reserve? You have any close relation there? Hum, um hum. Well, whether that's a conscious, you know they could serve that purpose without it's being wholly conscious, I mean obviously. So that brings in a lot of issues. These are excellent questions as a matter of fact. How about a couple more. Two more.

Q:

Hummmm. You read it, did you?

Q:

That surprises me. How many people had that question in their minds if they read it. How many of you have read Victory Is Possible by Collin

Grey? Now how many had the question in their minds, why was this assigned? Why is it there? Oh, well, not too many. Not as good a question as I thought. If a lot of people asked that I would be very struck. I'll say again, a short and not complete answer, adequate answer is that I really gave serious thought as to whether I should not simply have made that the main reading in the course and used it as a gloss for as a reading, as a background to my lectures. It did seem to me the relation was extremely close. But... even though most people didn't have your particular uncertainty about it I do want to answer your question because it's a good way of summarizing what the course is about I think. OK. One other.

Q:

Have whose opinions changed?

Q:

That's a good question also because I take it that you... I just reread that article and noticed that many of the things he says about what's possible to do—what's feasible to do—in the way of keeping casualties down is of course just simply invalidated by the nuclear winter. And I'm not aware of any response yet to the nuclear winter thesis—serious response by any member of the administration. Has anybody really heard anything or can fill me in on that? They I think want it to go away and

be noticed as little as possible and are taking the view that to pay any attention to it will merely publicize an extremely damaging argument as far as their strategy is concerned. And it of course challenges their own deep thinking. I do think that many members of this administration believe what they are saying pretty much about the validity—the utility—of various efforts to limit damage in nuclear war. And this cuts right at their basic argument.

Let me mention one thing that may not be obvious from reading the Colin Grey article. When this team, which has been pretty close—they go to conferences together, work together pretty much... (People like Richard Pearl and Colin Grey and Luke Locke and Richard Burt and various other strategists of the administrations. Scott Thompson and Van Cleave. Several people who are mostly associated with either the Committee for Present Danger or the Coalition for Peace Through Strength—two large public lobbies for the arms race, essentially, for the new weapons, starting in about '77.) A key element in their program (and in their thinking about these problems) is the possibility of evacuation by either side.

When they talk about civil defense for either the Soviets or the U.S. what they are thinking of primarily is evacuation in a crisis, or in preparation for a possible escalation of the war—preferably to prepared shelters out in the countryside, fallout shelters—which would not have to be blast shelters. They would be away from cities. They wouldn't even have to have in principal in tents, radiation resistance. They would just keep you for four or five days, maybe two weeks, away from the fallout.

And the point that they have been making for a long time is the point that Herman Kahn really first made 25 years ago now, that the Soviets could evacuate their cities (as they have paper plans to do). They could carry this out. Evacuate to the countryside, and then threaten us with the initiation of a nuclear war; pointing out as Herman would say, Colin Grey would say, that if it came to a nuclear war and we failed to back down, we would be risking our entire population in the absence of evacuation capabilities. Whereas they, with their people outside of cities, would effectively be safe from the worst we could do. We couldn't hunt them down. We won't have enough warheads. Our warheads aren't big enough. We don't have enough megatonnage. This accounts by the way for the emphasis on megatonnage which Visca and the Committee for Present Danger and Reagan made. The megatonnage gap, the fact that the Soviets had a larger overall throw weight, a capability to land explosive power on us.

So far as hitting cities are concerned, that megatonnage can't be said to have much effect, even before nuclear winter considerations. Because with smaller warheads you can destroy the cities as Hiroshima and Nagasaki showed. But if you try to create enormous amounts of fallout for the countryside then throw weight doesn't matter. You want very large, very dirty warheads.

So the notion that the Russians had that capability and simultaneously were practicing evacuation—had plans, I should say, for evacuation—suggested to Visca and others that what they were preparing to do then was to take their citizens, put them out of harm's way in

effect, and challenge us to engage in a war if we wanted knowing that we had our whole population at risk and they "under these circumstances could lose at most 10 percent or so of their population." Or they would give figures like 10 million or at the worst 20 million, which was what they suffered in WW II.

In fact at a hearing before the California Legislature held in L.A. at which I testified for the freeze, Edward Teller made this statement. That they could do that and at the most what could be threatened in retaliation by the U.S. was casualties less than the Soviets had suffered in WW II. I'm just telling you that when you see what look very strange assertions like that, what lies behind them is a calculation based on Soviet evacuation. It might be mentioned that the Soviets have never in fact practiced the evacuation any more than we have. They have never rehearsed it. It obviously would take a tremendous amount of planning. They have made no preparations that anyone knows of in the countryside to receive these evacuees other than very marginal stockpiling of some kinds of materials. But in terms of building up fallout shelters. If this happened in the winter it could easily have been seen that you know, the impossibility of people surviving in the Russian countryside would seem very marginal and so forth.

Anyway, when Teller said this I had a chance to comment afterwards and I said to him. He said it was simply not feasible. I said, "If you were given the task of beating that Soviet strategy—that is opposing a threat of annihilation essentially—would you reject that task because it was infeasible? Because you could not solve it physically? And he said,

very forthrightly, "That is right, it would not be feasible. I would not do it."

He had solved the problem actually. In fact it had been solved before him. He can't even take credit for solving it. Oppenheimer had solved it with the A-bomb. The fact is of using A-bombs to burn the cities even with no people in them creates the soot that would have these climatic effects if it's done on a large enough scale. What can be said more precisely is this now. Not that the problem has definitely been solved because this is based (as was pointed out to me by one of the people in the seminar today) on limited models—the nuclear winter hypothesis—that can't be said to be adequately analyzed at this point.

What is new this year is this. Teller could say last year that no one had defined a mechanism—a chain of physical events—that would lead to the extinction of all life in the northern hemisphere, all life on earth, or even most life outside the cities in the Soviet Union. He wouldn't... I don't know if he would have said... He might have claimed that. That wasn't very valid. At any rate, no one could say that they knew a mechanism whereby you could, with existing nuclear weapons, destroy let us say all life in the northern hemisphere or all life on earth. It could not honestly or conscientiously be ruled out because everyone knew the uncertainties of the information was so great that you couldn't say it couldn't happen. But no one could say how it would happen at that point.

What is new is that these physicists have now laid out a possible and even plausible chain of events which could lead to the death of all life

on earth. And with somewhat greater ease—with less megatonnage, with less concern for what targets we hit—could lead to the death of most people in the northern hemisphere wherever they were. And even if they did have fallout shelters and blast shelters in which they could stay for months. There is such a process, then.

Correct me (if John is here, is having this discussion, or any physicist may correct me) but I think the following is a statement of the state of knowledge as it exists now. In the few months that this hypothesis has been available (presented in the pages of Science magazine and other places—Foreign Affairs—by Sagan and others) I believe no one has been able to say that this could not happen—or even that it was highly unlikely. So as of now I think what is unchallenged is that it is possible—seems possible—and cannot be said to be highly unlikely. Beyond that it would be hard to say because the hypothetical nature of it—the inadequacies of the analyses—are such that you can't say much more. But it is no longer the case that Teller could say honestly, I think, "No reputable scientists have been able to show how these weapons could destroy all life."

To say the least then at this moment the Soviets, like ourselves, are presented with a risk from which they cannot escape by evacuation. That everyone will go, including all Russians. And that destroys the assurance of the Colin Grey argument that the measures that he proposes would certainly make a difference. Obviously that applies to the U.S. as well.

OK. I'll add to this list just two more. Anybody want to stretch far afield or are we satisfied with the type of thing that's been asked so far?

Q:

Change them when, at what point?

Q:

OK. I'm not quite with you. Could you give me an example of a country you are thinking of, or a circumstance?

Q:

You were relating it to the nuclear winter question?

Q:

OK. I get you now. OK. All right. One last, and if I can invite this. I am sure there are people in this course who are more confused about where it is going or what has been said or more outraged let's say than I've heard yet in the excellent questions so far. Let me have a... see if I can have somebody raise a question to unburden yourself if you feel that way. Two hands. Yeah?

Q:

How many are interested in that subject? OK. All right. I should have asked that on some of the other questions. I saw one other hand.

Q:

Well you're saying you feel this? Or you're asking how do I respond?

Q:

You know, I wonder if that is a prevalent attitude. Could you hear the question? The question was how do I respond or relate to the feeling in the country that the chance of the nuclear weapons going off, being used, is really very low because of the disastrous consequences of using them and thus they really will not be used.

I would say that polls don't suggest that is the psychology of the country at this point. It might have been true a few years ago. At least people weren't thinking about the problem then and there is some evidence that they both are thinking more about it and also are doing so because they actually feel that the risk is growing in various ways.

And those who do feel that have at least a couple of reasons for feeling it. They can see that both sides are greatly acting as if they regarded nuclear weapons as useable and useful and are building them up enormously. So there are more weapons coming. They have heard a good

deal (however they understand it entirely) but they have heard a good deal that the new weapons coming up are unstabilizing—or make the risks of war more likely than they were before. And finally, Reagan has frightened large elements of every country who's heard him speak on this issue including Republican Party. When we say that 80 percent, 70–80 percent of the American people support a bilateral freeze in opposition to the President's refusal to ~~oppose~~^{support} such a thing, you are obviously talking about a great many Republicans who differ with their president on this issue. And the polls suggest that they do so because of a quite sharp concern. In fact for all the intensity of feeling about the economy, virtually all polls show that concern about nuclear war in more or less the near future, is either a very close second or is quite equal to concern about the economy.

So in short I don't really have the feeling that that is any longer a major issue. On the contrary I think that what this course is addressed to is a question that people do have in their minds: How is it the case that the risk of war is as great as it seems to be? Despite its devastating character. How did this come about? Why is it happening? And so forth. That's what this course is about and I think it is addressed to a more vivid concern in people's minds than the idea that what is to be explained is the low risk of nuclear war. OK? That's my impression anyway. Well now a lot of hands. I am ready to start answering but since you have your hands up, let's hear it.

Q:

Could you hear that? OK. He points out that the military industrial complex that Eisenhower warned about has not shrunk since Eisenhower left office. Seems to be getting bigger—still with us. Still very influential. So much so that it raises the question: Can a president actually reverse this process? What can a president do? That fits in very well with some of the other questions so I'm glad to have that. I'll try to get faster since I'm glad to see hands going up. And I'm glad to have some more women also.

Q:

The last bit again...

Q:

OK. Good. Let's see who has their hands up right now. I'll take those. No cheating.

Q:

OK.

Q:

Can you hear this? Please try... We know you're selfconscious about it I know.

Q:

OK. Do I agree with Noam Chomsky's view that the use of nuclear weapons is to achieve nonintervention of the other ^{so} super power when one is involved in intervention in a third country. I wanted to get that right because it's a good formula. I think that is right by the way, largely, as a good approximation for most of the purposes. Is the use of nuclear weapons (but I'll come back to that) to achieve nonintervention of the other superpower when one is involved in intervention in a third country. OK?

Q:

Then is not the crucial problem the recognition of the sovereignty of other nations as opposed to the intervention is what you are saying. All right. Any others?

Q:

To make them doubt whether they know the answers.

Q:

Yeah, they don't engage in a whole lot of debate as a matter of fact. How did this come about? He says he was debating the State Department, is that correct? Well, people in the State Department was it?

Q:

Yeah, OK. The assertion is that they welcome the debate. Frankly I would welcome the debate—that they debate me or that they debate other people. They don't very much as a matter of fact. They may have given the impression that they were welcoming the debate. I can tell you Burt is specifically and Richard Pearl¹² and others have been urged a number of times to debate me specifically at Berkeley and other places and other people—not just me obviously. And on the whole they don't. Which is not to say that they don't feel confident. I'm sure that Burt and Pearl do feel pretty confident. But the administration does not supply them, does not provide them in fact very often. I think they do feel confident of their views which is in my own opinion a measure of our predicament.

Q:

Well, debate with them. We'll have a public debate as informed by this course. And let the truth prevail which is the way it works, right? Free market place of ideas. Well, that's not a satisfying answer to you but maybe we'll do better later.

Q:

Could you hear that? She said we've heard about the state of things up till now and for that matter we haven't really gotten up to the present as

you realize but you would like to hear alternatives and of course several people have asked what can be done, can anything be done and so forth. I should say, before going to the last question there, that obviously what I do mostly politically, is lecture. And what I lecture on is primarily that question. Where are we right now? Where is it going? Can we change it? What should we do? And I don't just do this because people ask me. I do it because it's my preoccupation and my main concern and I do have a good deal to say.

This course of course gave me the opportunity to take a group of Americans and lead them a bit or get them to raise questions about things I really don't have time to raise in a single lecture with people. Such as the history, how did we get here, what are the deeper roots of some of these things and what are the historical aspects of it. And what are some theoretical aspects. In fact much of what I've said since the first lecture are things that I never find I have occasion to say. It just doesn't seem high enough priority. So I'm very happy to get to them.

I had sort of planned to get to those questions on the last lecture. But I have heard that there is enough concern about where is this all going, what is the point of it... It's been expressed in sections. It did occur to me today that perhaps I should jump the gun a little and get into some of these things today. How many people would like that? And how many people don't care or would prefer not to get into it? OK. A fair number would like to get into that tonight so let me assume that we will. And one last question.

Q:

OK. And now with this menu of things that have been raised. I will give one last chance. Does anybody feel now that something just has egregiously has been left out or you feel really very urgent about adding to that list? OK. No. Good. Let me see if I can consolidate here for just a second. Save some time.

OK. I think I can group these a bit. OK. Let me group them in the following ways. You won't recognize the questions here but it relates to several of the questions. How would I now characterize the current situation and briefly what we are doing here as a country—what our leaders are up to. That is then to jump ahead a bit to the last couple of lectures I had planned. I haven't said too much about where we are right now. But I think that is implied in questions about the instability, the morality of the targeting, questions of proliferation right now, a question of why this is happening—why this is happening right now. That does have a lot to do with the foreign policy which is hardly pointed out. I haven't said much about, really. And a part of the current situation is the proliferation issue. The possibilities for countries other than the Soviet Union and the U.S. And the current role of the U.S. Marines in Lebanon for example. I think you'll see I can fit those questions in.

Another question would be what are our alternatives? As you say, what are some alternative policies that could be followed and how might we get there? The question was asked, do acts such as the one I

participated in last weekend really contribute anything? And of course I wouldn't have done it so happens if I didn't feel it contributed. But obviously in a very small, marginal way. The larger question, then, would be what are the combination of activities that may make a difference to the situation? OK?

On the question of where we are now or where we are headed. My comment on Colin Grey's article (I gave part of the answer there, not much of it) "Victory is Possible" my comment would be (why that's in the reading) is that it expresses a point of view that has been shared by a number of people and in particular a number of institutions from the beginning of the arms race.

Another very close... If you had read the Herman Kahn on the recommended reading—how many of you have read that? Anybody? Those of you who have read that and the Colin Grey will see that Grey is doing nothing other than paraphrasing what Herman Kahn wrote about 20 years earlier. It's almost identical—there's very little change—a few numbers are brought up to date. But he doesn't deal in numbers too much. The strategy—what he says is possible, what he says is desirable—is almost exactly what Herman Kahn was saying 20 years ago.

Not entirely coincidental, he was working for Herman Kahn at the time he wrote this at the Hudson Institute. But it goes back well before Herman Kahn. If you were to read the Paul Nitze articles which are on the recommended reading also (which we were discussing in the seminar today) you'll find that the attitude as reported by Nitze, the strategy basically goes back to the beginning of the bilateral nuclear era—at

least to the beginning of the period when the Soviets also had nuclear weapons. And I'll try to paraphrase it briefly. And if I fail, raise your hands and wave them and I'll get on a different subject. I don't want to spend all night on this.

At the point when the Soviets exploded a nuclear weapon—thus ending the U.S. monopoly faster (considerably faster) than Harry Truman and his top civilian advisors had expected. He describes a meeting there actually of four significant people—Acheson, the Secretary of State; Oppenheimer, the father of the A-bomb; Kennan; and himself. George Kennan was for no first use then. I won't go through the description of that we had in the seminar this afternoon, just to say that Nitze's own position at that time was this.

We have lost our monopoly but that does not mean that we should give up the use of nuclear weapons in relation to our foreign policy. The Soviet advantages in areas of interest to us (which included Europe and definitely the Middle East as early as that and certain parts of the Far East which they were closer to than we were) and their advantages in conventional forces (which Nitze and others exaggerated at that time but which were very strong), are such that we cannot meet our "global interests" by relying on conventional weapons alone. At least he said it will take time and effort and it's problematic that we will ever succeed. It would take time and effort to bring our conventional non-nuclear forces up to any parity with the Soviet Union. That may never happen. Nitze would say, surely now, 25 years later, that it has never happened. Therefore he said we should strive to maintain as great a margin of superiority as possible as long as possible.

The use to be made of that is spelled out by Nitze in other articles, including one earlier in '56 that is written later, after this episode. And it's pretty much what Colin Grey and Herman Kahn and others were saying. And it's this. The basic use of the nuclear weapons is to supplement our inferior conventional forces in various parts of the world with a threat of first use. To make a threat credible of first use, or to have any confidence that you can use nuclear weapons to advantage (I'm paraphrasing all these arguments now in the following way) you have to have some basis for believing or hoping that the use will be one-sided effectively. Or at least will remain very limited. How can it be one-sided used against a country that has nuclear weapons like the Soviet Union? (After '49.) Or a country that is allied to the Soviet Union which the Soviet Union might support?

The basis for hoping that the use is one-sided—unilateral—can only be that the Soviets are afraid to retaliate, or to retaliate in favor of their ally. Deterred from doing so by the fear that if they do so our response will be again to their disadvantage. Two ways of persuading them that if they retaliate they will regret it. Retaliate now to a local, limited use of nuclear weapons in support basically of our ground forces or in some cases our allies' ground forces where they are proxies for us. You'll recognize the questions now about the interventionary force here and the U.S. Marines as coming into this.

Why won't they retaliate? It must be because they fear that if they did so we would raise the stakes. Why would we choose to raise the stakes if we were in control of this? Couldn't they meet us again? We

would only raise the stakes, rationally, if we had some reason to hope that that will be the end of it. We have now outbid them. Perhaps they can't match us at that higher level.

Let me give you an example of that. Supposing they attacked Western Europe as in the 50s might have happened and we hit their troops in East Europe and in West Europe. Suppose they retaliated as they could even in the early fifties against our allies and our troops in Europe? That would be tit for tat as they say in the Pentagon. It would be retaliation in kind. If they had done that we could have hit Russia in a massive way in retaliation to that and they could not have done the same to the United States. They had no delivery capability to send weapons to the United States in the early fifties. Nothing very significant even in the mid fifties and in fact, had we attacked their bases (and this gets to this question of military targeting which you started with) had we attacked their bases they simply physically could not have attacked the United States.

Nitze's point is that this sequence of hypothetical responses should suggest to the Soviets that they should not attack Western Europe in the first place. Because if they did so we would be likely to retaliate with tactical nuclear weapons in the belief that they would not respond at all. After all, if the

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was likely to be that the United States would then annihilate them. They would be deterred from retaliating even though their troops had just been

destroyed by nuclear weapons. They still have their cities to lose. Why would they be sure of that? Because we could do it essentially without fear of retaliation. Therefore they would be sure. Therefore they won't start the sequence. OK. Is that clear enough? That sequence of reasoning?

So what Nitze is saying is you can live without monopoly and still use and threaten nuclear weapons. Even though other opponents have nuclear weapons in the world. But to do that you do need superiority. That was his use of the word superiority. If you can maintain a significant superiority at every single level, the Soviets will never be encouraged to retaliate in kind to our use of nuclear weapons (by their hope that if we retaliated to that they would be at a disadvantage). Because it must never be the case that there is some level to which they could escalate at which they would have an advantage.

If there was such a situation—say they could wipe out our retaliatory force (which we feared was possible in the late fifties, which I feared in the Pentagon personally, and in the Rand Corporation). If that were the case they could threaten to jump the bid. They don't have to go up by increments. They could just say, if you press us that hard by retaliating to our retaliation we could just wipe you out. Maybe you could do the same to us. But if you press us that hard, that's what we would do.

That would be an unsatisfactory situation to us, says Nitze, because we couldn't then plausibly threaten to start the whole process. We would be in too great danger of what some have called an eruption, or an

explosion—a jumping up the escalation ladder—to a full scale attack on us. It is therefore very important that the Soviets not have superiority at the strategic level or any other level. In fact, parity is not adequate. The United States must have superiority.

Now I am approaching the foreign policy aspects of that, so let me fill in one link. Why must we have superiority? Because the United States, unlike the Soviet Union, (there is an asymmetry here of geography in part) the United States has interests where it cannot match the Soviet Union in conventional forces. To begin with (and he mentions this in the very same article) we have a very strong interest in the oil of Iran and the oil of the Middle East which would be threatened if we lost Iran.

The example would set dominos to falling and so forth.

And I find by the way (in the war planning, as you will see in the Herkin book) the Middle East is mentioned (and the oil of the Middle East is mentioned) in every paragraph where NATO is threatened. There's a transcendant problem. I, myself, had grown up in the Pentagon believing that our nuclear weapons had been oriented almost completely on NATO early on. And I had not heard the word Middle East all that often.

I was very interested to find (in the early war planning) that although NATO was the public rationale for our forces, the Middle East in fact is always mentioned in the same breath. And the reason for it being that the value of the oil of that area is so great for us on the one hand, and it's next to the Soviet Union on the other (as is West Europe next to the forces of East Europe).

In either case, then, we have interests that we can't protect with conventional force alone. It is the United States, then, which requires

to protect those interests (if we are to maintain those interests and not let them be "jeopardized"). To protect them by the threat of intervention as the question was raised over here.

But to back up that interventionary threat—to make it credible and to make it usable if our initial deterrence fails, if we have to intervene—we back that up with the threat of using tactical nuclear weapons. And to make that threat credible, and again, safe enough to do if we have to do it, you have to have a threat to escalate still further—credibly. The only remotely satisfactory basis for that threat to escalate (and the threat to use a first strike as the ultimate escalation) must be that we feel that we will get off acceptably well if we do that. And if possible that should be based on a clear unequivocal superiority. OK? So is the logic of that clear enough so far?

It's not, then, a recipe for having nuclear wars and surviving them. It is a question of making credible threats and defending our interests by doing that. The Soviet empire in East Europe (and now in Afghanistan and various other places—mostly on the border of the Soviet Union) is almost defined by areas in which they have (or their allies have) a strong preponderance of conventional non nuclear force. Where they or their proxy armies are sitting in major force. That is their empire.

Our sphere of influence, or empire—informal empire—... I don't want to get into an argument over terms, but the notion of an empire in which one's influence is exercised largely or mainly through proxies with formal independence, is not a concept that the U.S. invented. It's very specifically that state of the British Empire (for example, in the first

half of the 19th Century, very largely) and it was known then as informal empire, or indirect empire, or even the empire of free trade.

There's a very good book by Bernard Semmel called The Empire of Free Trade on the British policies in the 19th Century. Which is extremely illuminating, I think, on the way our own leaders are (now we're getting more into the substance of foreign policy) in which our own leaders have seen U.S. interests in the world since the Second World War. The correspondence between the way in which our dominant leaders (our elites, our governmental officials here) have seen our interest is remarkably like the way that leaders of the British Empire saw their interests—in particular both in the first and the second—both parts of the 19th century. I won't specify that further at the moment.

But in this sphere of influence (just to avoid the provocative word empire at the moment) it is so far flung—stretches so far from our borders, indeed up to the borders of the Soviet Union or its occupied forces, or its proxy forces—up to the Iron Curtain, that the concept is it can only be defended in part by the threat of first use of nuclear weapons. And this is the Nitze concept I am saying.

It is shared by various institutions that I mentioned earlier, that have various interests in believing this—that the U.S. must rely on this threat and so forth. Mainly the people who control the nuclear weapons to begin with—the United States Air Force. Whose whole raison d'etre actually, in scale terms (and its claim for a large share of the budget) was its ability to deliver nuclear weapons and its need for more planes to do it reliably, and so forth. This initially in a period, remember, when the Soviets had no nuclear weapons.

The Air Force claim for a large share of the budget in those days, and the aerospace industry (which depended on Air Force orders in those days after the war) would hardly have been served by a philosophy that George Kennon was already propounding—that nuclear weapons should be only to deter nuclear attack. You didn't need too many when we had a monopoly in the world to deter nuclear attack. There was no one else in the late forties who could deliver an attack. So that wouldn't have justified a very large air force. I am not saying (quite) that the air force just jimmied up this approach and theory so as to justify a large air force, but I am saying that like every other person—you, me and every institution you'll ever be part of—they did see the interests of the country and of humanity in ways that were in harmony with what seemed good for their own institution. And that's true of a lot of people. In the case of the air force it led to a strong commitment to this philosophy of what nuclear weapons were for, and what the country needed. The aerospace industry the same, as I've said.

Moreover, the conception of the United States as having very far flung vital interests, in maintaining (very specifically now) access to the markets, the raw materials, to business activity—profits, investment, trade of various kinds—in as large a part of the world as possible, this is a very widely shared belief in governmental circles and in business circles. It is now quite self evident because early in this period there was a strong element of our business community and of the Republican Party that denied that—that said we'll get into trouble if we insist on making the whole world open (the open door policy) to U.S.

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trade. If we are ready to send the marines every time a new country nationalizes something or every time there is a "liberation struggle" whose color we don't like. Taft and others, leader of the Republican Party, were very articulate on the point, not only do we not need this but it will get us into terrible trouble. It would make us into a garrison state. It will build up the Defense Department and thus the influence of the Defense Department. It will make us militaristic and it will involve us in costly, stalemated wars which we will not win. It's an analysis, by the way, which doesn't look bad forty years later.

Q: Are you talking about the buildup of nuclear...

Both. Both nuclear and convention.

Q:

Oh, OK. That's what I'm getting to. First there were those who said, we can't afford this therefore we must cut back our interests. We must shrink our notion of what constitutes vital interest to, let us say, Western Europe, Japan—places we are ready to make full scale alliances with, basically. Parts of Latin America, and so forth. And this was associated (I'm getting to your point) with very prestigious figures—Taft being one in particular. But large parts of the Republican Party, large parts of the business community—businesses, by the way, that were not into multinational trade very much—local insurance

companies, local real estate companies, local manufacturing that could be quite large but not to involve import-export and did not want to pay the taxes to provide large armed forces for intervention abroad or entangling alliances. As I say at that point in our history there was a fairly significant force. There were intellectuals like, or columnists like Walter Lipman, who said very similar things at the time. In other words on more or less the right or the center as well as people more to the left or liberal like Henry Wallace and others were saying.

These people lost, essentially, on the policy. And for a lot of reasons. But one factor was that there was a quite widespread belief that we would lose a lot if we gave up our business access—our economic access—on free terms, on open door terms. If we had to bargain with states who had nationalized resources rather than having our large corporations bargain with very small, almost feudal, economies and small business firms individually as they could in our own country. So that we would give up a lot if we, in other words if that open door were shut to American business.

Thus it was worth something to keep those doors open to American business, in part so we would not relive the depression of the thirties which was in large part thought to be a consequence of the policies of other countries of shutting their door to each other and to us. Bilateral trading policies instead of open markets, instead of multilateral trading policies and nationalization—represented both by the Soviets and by the Nazis. Both with closed blocs.

But to make the point here we were just as (those were two very authoritarian spheres) we were equally concerned about the practices of

the British Empire and its imperial preference which closed the door considerably to us throughout the British Commonwealth. And a feeling that that had contributed to the recession in the world and specifically to our own problems. This is a country which has both surpluses in agricultural products (that is a desire, a need, an advantage in exporting) and industrial as well as capital, and just across the board, really. So unlike countries that benefit by making bilateral deals—my manufactured goods for your raw materials—we want to sell both agricultural goods and raw materials and for that we need complicated patterns of trade with as much of the world open to this as possible so that the markets are as free as possible.

The question is what should we be prepared to do to achieve that and how much will it cost? Basically, Atchison was suggesting, in this conversation with Nitze it so happened (according to Nitze) that we do it with conventional weapons because the nuclear would simply be cancelled out by the Soviets. This took place just after the Soviet explosion of a nuclear weapon. He said, "Although we are ahead now, soon this advantage will go away. We will be at parity. When we are at parity," he said (and Nitze would agree with this) "You can still threaten nuclear weapons, but you have no basis for believing (or hoping very strongly) that the other side will not reply with nuclear weapons since they have an equal capability to do so. They will not be deterred from doing that by the belief that you have a superior ability to up the ante because you don't have it. So you can still make threats in places of vital interest, but no longer with the belief that the threat will remain

unilateral or even limited. It may go all the way. Thus we will be considerably deterred ourselves. Thus we can't even make the threat credibly. Thus we better not intervene or our marines will be in trouble." OK.

One answer then is enlarge the marine force, enlarge the army, have enough so that you can match anybody on the ground. Nitze's point is we can't afford that. Of course that partly depends on what you think the other side will put in. But he felt in general, we just can't match the Russians, for sure. That's always been the belief in NATO. That is, by the way, almost certainly untrue in the case of NATO. Unlike the Middle East, in NATO we're dealing with strong governments, strong tax bases, large GNPs. They have larger populations, both in absolute terms, and a larger population of draft age males in the NATO countries (including the U.S.), than in the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. The population of males is larger, the GNP (gross national product) is enormously larger, the men under arms in the U.S. and NATO have almost every year been greater numerically than the men under arms in the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. Or if less, very slightly less.

How many here knew all these facts about NATO. How many did not know that? These are just simple demographic facts about this thing. The idea that we can't match the Russians physically, or can't match the Warsaw Pact is absurdly untrue. And by the way, with all the controversy about recent spending on military matters. A very deceptive aspect of that has been to compare only the U.S. to the Soviet Union. The fact is that the Western European allies are so much larger in economics than the

Eastern European that they greatly outspend the Warsaw Pact countries. And when you put the Warsaw Pact European countries with Russia the total of their spending—no matter how it is calculated, by CIA methods, Reagan methods, however, with all the controversies involved in it—is much less than NATO including the U.S.

Again, how many people knew that? It has not been pressed on the American public's attention. There has been a process throughout the Cold War, of deliberately, consciously, exaggerating the dimensions of the so-called, the alleged inferiority on the ground and the nature of that between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Whatever the problems may be of confronting them with non nuclear weapons (and there are real problems) they are not what administrations have described them as being. And they don't have the scale as they are described.

But in any case the case was made (and many people agreed) the interests are important and you can't do it reliably with conventional weapons. Notice right now, speaking of Lebanon, to match even the Syrians would require hundreds of thousands of troops—given what the Syrians can put in to Lebanon. And the idea of doing that in more than one place at one time, which could arise, or even in one place on a very large scale, is in fact, difficult economically and other ways. Especially because (remember in the wake of the Second World War our leaders were very impressed with the unwillingness of the American people to provide large forces)...

Well, that strategy was challenged actually (twice, really). We fought Korea without using nuclear weapons except in the threat that came

up—without exploding nuclear weapons. We did not lose in Korea. However, the American public came out of that, and especially the military, with the feeling, never again for a long time. Which meant never again without nuclear weapons. And that was the setting for the emphasis on nuclear weapons in the Eisenhower Administration that followed. I am going to come up to the present now.

I think we are going through something that has a number of similarities and some differences from that period, but fundamental similarities. Vietnam, like Korea, was a conscious attempt by a Democratic administration initially, to achieve our purposes in an intervention—in a conflict in the Third World—without actually exploding nuclear weapons.

In the case of Vietnam, of course, we sent 500,000 troops, more than we ever did in... I mean we had a level of 500,000 troops—we had sent several million troops over there. Far more than Korea. Again the result was far from satisfactory, to say the least. And a lot of people came out of that with the notion, never again, just as in Korea. At this point, in other words in the sense that we cannot protect our leaders' sense of our vital interests (where a vital interest is operationally defined as an interest for which you will fight), we cannot do that as Kennedy and Johnson in particular did, with ground troops. We will be outmatched even if the Soviets don't come in.

That was something of a surprise, of course, in Vietnam, but they learned that. That leaves you with two alternatives. Don't send the Marines next time (which amounts to saying, "Take your chances with those

'interests'. Don't regard them as a cause for war anymore." That doesn't mean you don't have interests. Obviously a lot of countries are forced to recognize interests in the world which they cannot defend with military means. And every country has lots of interests that it does not propose to defend with military means (including the U.S.).

We would have to enlarge that group if we went this route, one route. And that is to say we will no longer protect those interests with military means. We can protect them with multilateral agreements, maybe with U.N. peace keeping forces, with diplomacy of various kinds, with institutions of world law, with arbitration, or by reducing our reliance on that area. For example, to come right up to the Middle East, a lot of people have pointed out that by rather moderate national measures of conservation—insulation, essentially—by insulating buildings in a way that is very straightforward technically, this country could totally eliminate its reliance on oil from the Middle East. Entirely. Easily reduce—in fact we have come close to doing that already because of the higher prices. So we could reduce our oil. Well, that's a way to go. That would leave Europe dependent. But then Europe hasn't shown quite the obsession that we have with maintaining U.S. control of their energy sources. They haven't shown the same willingness to see major war result over that question.

The other approach, then, is essentially what was chosen after Korea. And that's to say go back to the Dulles-Eisenhower period, which (I've just pointed out) did not start with the Republicans. It was enunciated under Nitze. There's really no difference between the Nitze

approach and the Dulles approach, or the Eisenhower, or Atchison, all the same. And that is to rely on a threat of nuclear weapons. The same logic prevails. Remember Nitze is still with us from '49. He's still back. Not only as the key member of the Committee for Present Danger which raised this issue in '77 and later; but came into the Reagan Administration as their negotiator on the I & F ^N forces. And that is then, that this approach is then reigning again. And that is, improve the expeditionary forces. Do not dispense with them. They learned that lesson, I think, from the Eisenhower years.

In particular Nitze criticized Eisenhower for omitting the conventional part of the spectrum. Eisenhower thought we couldn't afford the conventionals at all. We had to rely almost entirely on nuclear weapon. Nitze always thought that was wrong, and Atchison did. But the argument is even stronger now because he could say (and does say), weak as Eisenhower's approach was in that time, it was based on near monopoly of strategic delivery forces. So he could threaten to go to nuclear war and just say, we'll do it. If you don't get out of an area where we don't want you to be and so forth, we'll hit you. And they couldn't hit back. So the threat was very credible relative to the present. That has changed. No more monopoly. No more of the kind of superiority—ever again—that Eisenhower enjoyed. That can't be retained.

There are two possibilities left for making those threats credible. Now I'm getting toward the argument about stability. I suggested in the last couple of lectures a third. One could think of a few ways. One is to simply appear wild. You know, ideological. I believe I can get away

Yes: with it. You know. I believe this will work out all right. If you can make that convincing enough you can scare people even if there is no objective basis for this position. Our administration is doing wonderful work in that... Of course, which is... They've scared me. I don't know about the Russians. But I am beginning to think they believe it. And that can work. Not with certainty, but it can work. Yeah?

Q:

Oh. Thank you. I'm always open to things like, "You fly is open," or this kind of thing. "You pants are burning." Thank you.

OK. I am anticipating now, the next lecture. I'll just try to say it briefly and not argue for it very much. This administration does talk (including Nitze, actually) as though superiority were again available in a meaningful sense. That is, however, only possible if the Soviets stop their own buildup. It is very hard to believe that the Soviets would do that. But Reagan seems to have achieved that on the basis of one advisor, Richard Pipes, from Harvard, who seems to tell him that the Soviets are so stretched that they simply cannot match us. And that may be true, they can't literally match us. But that they really will have to give up the arms race at some point; recognize that they've got to make a deal basically, and stop while we increase our forces so greatly as to achieve once again a striking superiority, thus resuscitating the credibility of our threats. Very few people believe that.

Reagan and others do talk about superiority from time to time, the word comes out. And of course it does reflect, as I've said, a very old

commitment to the idea that superiority is possible and desireable and indeed Nitze and others were, in effect right, about something that a lot of people do not imagine. They did foresee the possibility of a very prolonged period of superiority. Most nuclear scientists didn't know much about Russia or politics but they could see that the Russians technically could match us early.

CPD Many people thought that you could not maintain that superiority very long. Indeed, Dulles and Eisenhower could not expect it to last as long as it did last. Actually it lasted about 20 years. So from that point of view the people who bet on maintaining superiority and bet on that being worthwhile, proved themselves to have made a better bet than their critics could imagine. That of course increased their confidence and their nostalgia in a way, for being right again. Doing it again.

I have found, though, that some people close to the administration react very (in the few debates that I've had a chance to have—and I learn from all of these) strongly against the idea that that's what everybody is trying to do—achieve superiority. It clearly is. Unless the Soviets stop, and more or less even if they do stop, a meaningful superiority in the old sense seems almost unachievable nowadays.

I was led to think is there any other way that a smart guy like Kitze (or people associated with him) could imagine that this kind of arms building could improve the credibility of threats even if it did not achieve superiority. And it occurred to me that the very weapons that they are building, have that character. And the reason is that they have the effect of destabilizing non nuclear war, or making it more likely that it will erupt into nuclear war by one side or the other.

The Soviets are cooperating with this approach by imitating our own technology. I say imitating because in every case they have come after us. You could interpret this that in a certain sense they have played into the hands by doing that, of those who want to preserve the credibility of nuclear explosion as a U.S. threat—as a threat of policy.

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The Soviets, like ourselves (I'll summarize in this way) have been building forces that both have the capability to attack part of our forces, and are themselves vulnerable to attack by our forces. The effect of both sides doing that, then, is to create a situation which was the nightmare of people in the 50s as a prospect and which they actually thought had arrived pretty much ^{quick} by 1960 or so. A situation of two sides, each of which could destroy a large part of the other side if it struck first. And each of which had a large part of its own forces vulnerable to the other side. So that the advantage of striking first in a crisis was ^{large} very great. It was an unstable situation. That's what a lot of people (including myself) thought had arrived in the era when we had a lot of vulnerable bombers and they had a lot of vulnerable missiles (we thought). They in fact didn't have the missiles.

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I was asked was that a situation sought, in fact, by our earlier leaders. I would say not. Certainly they did not (by every chance. You know, they did not want the Soviets to build those missiles that they thought they were building. Indeed, Eisenhower himself, who made that delegation, didn't really believe that they did have those missiles. And he was right. But he hedged against the possibility that they did by delegating the command and control. In other words I think that in those

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days, the delegation matters, the high alert, the hair trigger aspect, was just a reflection of an unfortunate reality, as they thought, that the situation had become very unstable. And you had to prepare for that. I don't think it was desired at all. It came out of an era when we had an unquestioned superiority. And that's what we wanted. We didn't want that to go away.

What we have done now on both sides is to create the world that we feared in the 50s but did not then come into existence. The reason it didn't was that the Soviets chose not to build the vulnerable forces that they could have built. So there was in fact a good deal of stability. More than the public understood in '59, '58—Quemoy Crisis, the 60 Laos Crisis (60-61), the Berlin Crisis, the Cuban Crisis. The likelihood that the Soviets would back down was greater than almost anybody in the public imagined because they didn't have the forces. They were so inferior. It was a stability, then, based not on the characteristics of the weapons which were vulnerable on both sides, but on the enormous superiority of the U.S.

A different kind of stability set in in the late sixties and early seventies when neither side had forces that were significantly vulnerable to the other side. Both had poured concrete around their silos. Us first. Very expensive process. The Soviets did it later which accounts for the reason that their expenditures had a big bulge in them. Their big spending came after our big spending leading to the Nitze/Reagan point that they are outspending us. We had built our silos before they had essentially. We had poured our concrete before they had. And they

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then proceeded after backing down in Cuba, in Quemoy, in Laos, in Berlin, all these places. That series of victories for nuclear threats—not recognized as such by most Americans (because they had not known of the threats we'd made)—had a price. And the price was that the Soviets decided that they would not be forced to back down again.

I saw in Sunday New York Times who was it...a comment by somebody fairly prominent—I can't think of...I'll think of it in a minute, saying the Soviets bluff and bluster, but faced with force they always back down. Well, that's pretty good on a historical record. But that historical record is largely (what we are looking at) is a record of a period when they were enormously inferior. The next part of the period is a period when they were determined not to be inferior so they would not have to back down as I said again. They didn't really arrive at that until the late 70s and they did not arrive at a situation which is (now we are at the present) until about '81, a situation where for the first time they could destroy a significant part of our missiles and had a threat of preemption.

X That threat of preemption I don't think serves Russian security very well. It has this advantage for them. The advantage is that if we get into a shooting crisis over Syria (next week, tomorrow, or whenever) the Russians can now say what they could not have said ten years ago. If this gets hot, and if one of us starts using nuclear weapons, and if that one is you, we will reply. And we'll do that because we think you may not reply again. And the reason we'll do that under these circumstances, and the reason we think we might think you won't is it's not only you

that might decide to go all the way if this gets hot enough. We will do terribly badly if we go first. But in a situation like that, because your forces are vulnerable to ours and our forces are vulnerable to yours, it will be obvious to you and me both, us both, that one or the other has a high likelihood of going first. And it may not be only you any more. That's what they've bought with this.

So you shouldn't get into that situation. Don't launch that first nuclear weapon. If an Iranian kamikaze pilot (even trained by Syria, maybe with a Russian warhead) destroys the battleship Iowa, ^{run - me} be cool. That's what they bought. Be cool because it's hard to trump that. You will be tempted to raise the stake to a small nuclear weapon, because what else? But if you do, you're getting into a situation that is highly dangerous for both of us and we might go first. Go first rather than go second. We'll go first knowing that it's the worst possible thing in the world for us to do except one thing, and that's go second. Why would we think we might have to go second if we don't go first? 'Cause you mothers bought the Mark 12A warhead for your Minuteman 3 four years before we bought our first strike weapon. You've been preparing for this for a long time. You've given every indication, starting with Carter and Ford, that you're preparing in such circumstances to knock out our missiles.

Well, who knows who will go first. They get an advantage. Maybe they could get away with blowing up the Iowa. I don't think that advantage was worth to them the risks it involved. The price they paid for going in that direction was enormous: a legitimating of our own

first strike weapons in alleged imitation of theirs. The fact that we started that counterforce threat first with the Minuteman 3 is simply missing from the American consciousness at practically every level. The notion that the Soviets started the counterforce race is taken for granted by every near expert who has been following the public accounts of this that you can find. It's false. And incidentally it's known to be false by any real expert of whom there's a fair number.

So I think the Soviets, by imitating us (including functionally), by wanting to have the same kinds of threats we have (which is what I think they've gone and done) have made a very, very great error for their own security and for the security of the world. They not only made it easier for the Reagan Administration and the Carter Administration to buy more such weapons for ourselves—specifically the MX which is frankly hard to sell. It needs every selling point it can get. And the Soviet SS-18 played into that almost crucially. But in a crisis it's my belief these weapons do make a difference.

Not everybody really thinks that. I think that from my knowledge of the way calculations are made in the Pentagon, that there are serious (not crazy) people, by normal standards, that we hire to do our planning for us and our military decision-making, who will, in a crisis, point out that the characteristics of the weapons on both sides are such that at this stage of the crisis, Mr. President, we are approaching the point of no return and the major likelihood that the Soviets will strike on us if we don't strike first. And they will do that in large part because they fear that we will do it if they don't. The logic of this was laid out by

Schelling in "Threat of Reciprocal Attack" and by Wohlstetter and others 20 years ago. And I believe there is a good deal of validity to the logic.

I am sure the same argument will be made on the Russian side. And in fact, it's that very inference which leads to the logic. Each side can see that the other will be doing similar reasoning because of the nature of the weapons that both are buying. First there was a question here.

Q:

Oh, you mean in this...? OK. Right. Except that as what to do about this. OK. A very good question. There was another one over here. I'll get to that.

Q:

The Reagan team, these analysts from the Committee for Present Danger, the Coalition for Peace... And if you don't know what I am referring to there, I strongly urge people here who have an interest in the foreign policy aspects of this or the arms race aspects, to read Gerry Sander's book Peddlers of Crisis, which started as a graduate study paper on the fact that somebody had mentioned to him that there were two Committees for Present Danger—the current one starting in '77 and an early one which was intended to implement the NSC 68 written by Paul Nitze which was the blueprint for heavy armament which worked out during the Korean

War in 1950. It turned out that the people were very largely the same people, had the same... This was not a mere coincidence in name. They had taken the same name of this earlier committee because it was pretty much the same people. And this group of people, in effect, have been very much for the MX.

We'll get to this again in a later lecture. I had planned, I think, in the 9th lecture to go into this but I'll just say it right now. If you look at the Scowcroft Report, Scowcroft being, by the way, a former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs who was at this Wincon Conference the other day. He is an intellectual—a very smart guy. I haven't met him but a lot of people I know have met him and thought very highly of by people like Tom Schelling and others, who works from the inside. And he was the one, then, to have a "bipartisan commission" to look at basing for the MX. And it was understood that it was to give a rationale supporting the MX for Reagan. Which he did. I think the argument was unusually candid. I put the Scowcroft Commission Report on the reading list. And you'll see in that that (I believe this is correct) no mention whatever is made on the need for the MX in a fixed silo—a Minuteman silo—to deter Soviet nuclear attack on the U.S.

Again I won't go through the whole argument now, I'll just say if you look at it notice that the only purpose that is described for the MX is related to the problem of deterring Soviet non-nuclear attack. Or, he says, Soviet limited nuclear attack. Now they never spell out how a Soviet nuclear limited attack might occur. Schlessinger has made this point, Defense Secretary Schlessinger, going back to '74. The

possibility that the Soviets might hit a few U.S. cities or a few U.S. Minuteman silos. What would we do about that? We don't want to have an allout holocaust. They never really suggested why such a thing might occur. Or a limited nuclear war. I put it to you then, just fill in these points in the background as you read it. The context of their assumption is a U.S. first use policy. In ???? but also elsewhere.

cher The premise, then, for the possible Soviet use of limited nuclear weapon is a U.S. first use of nuclear weapons against the Soviet troops or Soviet allies. And that's possible. So is a Soviet limited nuclear attack conceivable? I would say the discussion of the last seven years has left almost no member of the public understanding that as to what in the world they were talking about here. Because the implication is that if the Soviet attack out of the blue why would they do that? There is a reason they might do that. And the reason is to carry out a threat they made to deter us from our first use of nuclear weapons. They don't want to carry out an allout attack. That's suicide. They carry out a limited attack. The issue, then is how do we deter them from doing that? That is from retaliating to our first use of nuclear weapons.

And the answer is the MX. If you use your SS-20s to respond to our use of Pershings or something else, or tactical nuclear weapons, we will decide that the likelihood of allout war has become so great we may decide, it has become so great that we can't afford to wait. If we didn't have the MX or the Minuteman 3 we could afford to wait because we have nothing to gain by going first. But in this situation, if we think the Soviets are about to attack we can achieve something. Namely we can

take out a large part of their land-based forces even if we leave a lot left. We can do something. That is a realistic incentive for military forces to pursue that. If we have the MX we can deter you from retaliating to our first use. If we don't have it we may be able to. If we don't have the MX we can't. That's the argument. Therefore even though the MX is not sure to have this effect, it's worth buying it. It's only a small percentage of GNP after all, etc. etc. And we'll get to where it may all go.

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their limited second use—their retaliation. Let me sum that up. The purpose is to make the world safe for U.S. interventionary forces. Why U.S. interventionary forces? That has to do with the nature of our foreign interests. I haven't said what those interests are in any detail. But I've said we perceive ourselves—our leaders perceive us as having major vital interests which in fact have to do with economic access and with the bases and so forth that are needed to protect that around the world. We need the intervention then to protect that presence in the world and we need the MX like the Pershing, like the neutron warheads. We need counterforce weapons at every level that will suggest to the Soviets that we have an advantage in using those weapons rather than suffering a defeat. That is more plausible than it would otherwise be because we can add to the notion of an advantage our current fear that if we don't escalate all the way, the Soviets will.

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We didn't have that argument five years ago because there was no way the Soviets could escalate and gain any advantage whatever. The SS-18 has given us, in effect, a chance to say, "If we don't go first, maybe the Russians will. Disastrous as it would be for them, disastrous as it will be for us. But it will be better than waiting." We can now say that. I think this was a catastrophic error by the Soviets. How could people have made such an error. Well, this is the context. It is the same error I would say that every one of our administrations has made since the Second World War. Granted at times it was not always as dangerous for us to make that choice of alliance ^{choice} on nuclear threats when we started out, because we had a near monopoly. The Soviets have never had that and never will. But it always had the likelihood of spurring a two-sided arms race if we let the arms race continue. If we did not seek an agreement to stop the arms race.

No administration I will assert, I am ^{un-}happy about this but I will say it's the case anyway, no administration has sincerely or effectively sought to end the nuclear arms race. And the reason they have not—it might not have been possible—but they have not sought to do it. And the reason that they have not sought to do it is that they have all accepted the logic that to do that would lead, even without testing on either side, the Soviets able ^{it} over time to overcome our lead. They couldn't get ahead of us without testing but they could achieve a kind of parity. We would have to give up on a first use threat—credible first use threat—if we did that. If we stopped at any point. We would have stopped ahead at almost every point. We would be ahead right now in fact

in most characteristics. But take something like accuracy. That can be improved over time without ^{by} testing and proved to a degree. To a degree enough to lower that margin.

Every administration has either believed the logic or has bent to the logic with the political forces behind it that the United States must strive to have superiority or at least a counterforce capability if possible. Notice that I'm saying now 'cause I'm really paraphrasing what I meant to say in three more lectures but I might not have achieved it then either. But dense as this is bear with it just one second.

? I am saying that I don't think any longer that superiority is their necessary conscious goal. But rather that as of now they see advantages in the kind of instability that did exist and was believed to exist twenty years ago as measured by the Command Control vulnerability, the delegation and so forth. They now see some advantages in making nuclear threats credible in a world where there is almost no alternative way to do that—to make those threats credible. It's a dangerous way—rocking the boat—I'm sure these people can see the dangers of that as well as (to a certain degree) as well as anybody. But they accept them because they see no alternative.

The alternative they see would be to give up our ability unilaterally to protect this to really determine the governments—to veto the nature of the governments in regimes all over the world. To give it up would be to give up a post WW II expansion of our sphere of influence in which we had the ability and right to intervene from the Caribbean (which was pre WW II to most of the world).

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like, now: on after 1991

It's not exaggerating too much to say that we came to see in the enormous euphoria of the end of WW II where we were the only undamaged industrial power in the world, vast financial, industrial assets and capabilities unmatched by any other country in the world. Vast armies as well, vast air force and so forth. Breakup of the colonial empires—our rivals generally. Opening of the world.

We came to see (at least potentially) most of the world outside the Iron Curtain as equivalent to the Caribbean in our ability as we thought—as we had in the past influenced events in the Caribbean. Notice that we don't control the Caribbean quite the way we used to. Any more than the French managed to control Indo China after 1945 the way they had done for a hundred years before 1945. The world has changed. But in any case that was the way it seemed to be and that was a very exciting and happy prospect for American decision makers. And they have been very anxious to hold onto that status quo ever since.

The current notion is that the only way to do that is not to tell the Soviets any longer, "We will make a cold blooded decision to ~~escalate~~ because we're so strong, so safe, so superior, that we can afford to do that. Rather, we make the kind of threats (and I'm not making a fundamental comparison, I'm making a very strict technical comparison here if I may for a moment) for making the kind of threats that Herman Goehring (head of the German Air Force) made to Henderson—the British Ambassador at the time of Munich. Talking now to a country—Britain—that in fact had larger air forces than Germany (though it didn't realize that) but in any case it was obviously a very large power militarily.

The Germans never claimed and did not believe that they could necessarily beat England. And of course they failed. That wasn't a total surprise.

The British knew that they were not likely to be beaten by the Germans.

RFK
K. J. E. What Goering said is, "If it means war, no one can tell how it will come out. But this much is sure, very many Britishers will die." And he did carry out that threat to a considerable extent although a lot more Germans died in the end. In other words, a situation will get started and we will be part of that, we guarantee that, which can get out of the control of either of us. And however it comes out it may be destructive for us, and of course it was, but you will regret, you will regret that this process got started, because it will be bad for both of us. That's the threat. That's not the best threat you'd like to make. He made a different threat to Austria as I was saying the other day, made a different threat to Czechoslovakia, "We'll crush you, we will smash you, you'd rather be able to make that threat, it's more credible, more effective. But if you can't make that threat there is one other you can make and that is, "There is a process here that will lead both of us on step by step until you are very sorry. And we may be very sorry too but that won't help you." It that's the only threat you can make, some people are in favor of making that. Our current administration, and the late Carter Administration, under I believe pressure from the forces that brought Reagan into power, however reluctantly, made that choice. I'll close with this thought.

I am not now saying what I may have seemed to be saying (maybe I did say) in the first lecture. I've influenced by scepticism and good

argument in my seminars just in the last few weeks and so what I'm about to say is either a clarification in my thinking of my expression or it's a change in my thinking. I'm not sure which anymore. I'll tell you what I now think this week. All right? And if I put it that way it's to emphasize something that these are very challenging and puzzling problems and I by no means think that I have the answer or the same answer I'll have a month from now or a year from now. The trajectory of my own thinking has been enough that I know for sure that I will see these things differently six months from now and this course is helping. So it may make you nervous or unhappy to hear this but you're not getting the last word if that's what you are here for. Even from me. And that means I know perfectly well that I can learn from others and I have already done it in the seminar.

I am not saying then that every president has believed the Nitze logic or the ^{Colin} Collin Grey logic. I'll be specific. I'll go further than that. I believe that Kennedy and Johnson in particular probably disbelieved the logic. And by that I mean I'm not saying simply that they didn't want a nuclear war. I don't think any of our presidents have wanted a nuclear war.

Kennedy and Johnson I think, according to McNamara, made a decision that they would never initiate nuclear war even though they did threaten it on occasion. But they were bluffing. They would not carry the threats out. We have no clear evidence that any of the presidents were different from that. I think they were in my own best assessment. But really they themselves couldn't know for sure whether in the very end

they would have carried out those threats ultimately. Eisenhower for example. They weren't on the whole tested to that point. Nixon was tested in '69 and did not carry out the threat but in part because of the domestic situation which was unprecedented at that time. So I am not sure that that was a pure bluff either had the domestic situation been different.

I think then that they did feel they were bluffing. What we then have to explain I assert, is why every administration has acted as if it believed this logic, including the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. Let me give you a tentative cut at that very fast. I think the answer is that some of the administrations did believe it. Specifically Eisenhower in his period of superiority did believe that it was necessary to initiate nuclear war under some circumstances, was prepared to do it at a time when that meant something quite different from what it would mean today. I believe that Reagan does understand this logic basically. And certainly the people in his administration do understand and accept it. Some others are interestingly difficult to assess. Just how much Nixon believed it by the time he came to office. He certainly believed it earlier when he was Vice President.

But some I think didn't believe it at all. By which I mean I don't think they thought the weapons were ^{not} useful, the weapons were ^{not} necessary and so forth. But they bought them nevertheless. And the quick answer to that is that there were institutional forces in our society, structural aspects of our society, that bent the president to that policy even if he thought it was not a good idea. He found himself going along with it.

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There is one other element here which is something I've particularly brought in to the discussion of these things. And that is the weapons side I've been talking about. The other side is every president I would say in every term with the possible exception of Ford, has found himself suddenly (often surprisingly) in a situation where this logic was impressed on him in that crisis where he suddenly was made aware of the asset that nuclear weapons constituted for him and on his need to use that asset as a threat. I would guess that Kennedy, Johnson, and certainly Carter had no expectation whatever that they would find themselves in that situation. But Carter did in the Mideast doctrine, after Afghanistan but especially after the fall of the Shah in '79 with his Mideast doctrine which did constitute a nuclear threat basically.

That can hardly be unrelated to the weakening of his own resistance to the arms forces that were pressing him toward this logic. It was not (1980—his election year against Reagan, the year just following the Russians in Afghanistan, the year of the Iranian hostage crisis) was not a good year to take action to lower the credibility of our first use threats; even though he may have come to office imagining that there was no credibility to first use threats and that he would never rely on them—no one should, no one could, and so forth.

He suddenly discovered that he didn't have anything else in the case of Iran. And so his people (as he saw if you read my Call to Mutiny) his assistant for public information in the State Department found himself on television that week reminding Americans that nuclear weapons had been used twice on humans and both times by an American president. And I

1980

don't think Carter foresaw authorizing his State Department spokesman to make that historical point for the American public. But he did it.

And that was the year that he pressed very much forward on the MX on PD-59 which was a war fighting doctrine and so forth. And I would just say these are somewhat related. In addition to the pressures he was under domestically there were external uses which presidents found themselves confronting. His alternative would have been to acknowledge that our interests could not be defended unilaterally by American military means. And he chose not to make that reduction of our sphere of influence in 1980—in election year—or a year earlier. As others have said, "I do not come to be a Queen's First Minister to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire," (Churchill's phrase).

No president has made a clear decision and stuck to it to preside over the shrinking of the American sphere of unilateral military influence. And that is not what he was elected to do. It's not what he expects will keep him in office. And he's probably right about that. One of the very possible few exceptions to that has been McGovern and McGovern's example did not encourage others to imitate him running for office. So. We're going to have a break in a minute. Do you have any other questions?

Q:

Shape it in what way?

Q:

To make the threats. To follow through in the way of making the threats? Yes. Yes, they do. And undoubtedly Reagan feels that and he has justice in feeling that. Nixon certainly felt that. We'll get to that. So I'll close this part on this thought. I said that I thought the Russians were mistaken to imitate us in this respect. I suppose it's implicit (or explicit) that I feel this is a bad policy for the United States. But I hope I've made it clear enough that I'm not agreeing with those who feel that it's bad because it is merely wasteful and wasteful because it cannot in any circumstance succeed. If that were the case one would expect to be able to convince a president that he has simply overlooked—he has simply misjudged the fact that this can work. He hasn't noticed that it can't work and therefore that he is wasting enormous trillions or billions, hundreds of billions of American money in pursuing this.

We could then hope to get the president on our side by just convincing him more or less by the logical argument that has convinced us. What has convinced you if you are convinced of this. Why not whatever discussion it was, whatever book you read, get it in to the hands of the president, the ears of the president. Why shouldn't he be as receptive to it as you were and see the light in effect? I think the situation is not like that.

The president sees to a considerable extent what the risks are (though I believe he would underestimate them in many ways) but does see

certain advantages to this approach. And the advantages which he may exaggerate are nevertheless real advantages. And why do I stress this? Well because I think it's the nature of reality. It's good to understand the reality if you want to operate in it or change it.

And specifically because it's worth knowing I think that the president is not easily recruited to the position (just by a discussion let's say or getting his attention) to the position that he should cease striving to enlarge the credibility of nuclear threats. The president in other words is not part of the freeze movement and is not likely to become so. Even a new president, simply by rational argument alone. There have been presidents, and I think Carter was one, who was thoroughly compatible with the motives, the aims of the freeze movement. And yet they apparently did not have the power to move in that direction by themselves.

So again, recruiting the president alone was not the problem—was not the issue. That's the problem then I want to address after a ten minute break here. And I'll put it in these terms. I don't think we'll change this policy against the resistance, in the end, of a president. How can we give a president who wants to end and reverse the arms race the power for the first time to do that? OK. Let's take a break.

BREAK

We'll review very quickly if I've answered... Did you have a question?
Is your hand up?

Q:

That's right.

Q:

You're following the logic both of what I'm saying and of the debate very well. And you're right in saying that to the extent that both sides accept I would have to say, not only the possibility but if they accepted—if they came to accept the near certainty of nuclear winter from a large nuclear war—that would eliminate the advantage of striking first rather than striking second and would greatly stabilize any level of war. The likelihood that it would erupt to allout war would be less. Of course that would not prevent the use of nuclear weapons against a country that did not have them which is the main form these threats have taken over the years in hopes that it would not lead to an allout war. That possibility would still remain and you have to work out, you know, various "scenarios" or sequences to show... I'm afraid it would not eliminate the possibility that such threats would be made.

The question was raised by a couple of questions related to proliferation. How would small countries... how were small countries related to these prospects? And the possibility that war between small countries would in fact not be precluded by this. No countries... I was asked, how have countries related to the fact that threats are being made against them over the last number of years.

No country and for twenty years this included the Soviet Union outside the U.S. has sought in fact to achieve parity with the U.S. The Soviets could have done it at great cost. Even they did not try until a number of years of setbacks and crises. Other countries who could have acquired nuclear weapons have not done so on the whole. In part because they hoped in many cases I believe that the super powers would end the arms race and reverse it. At least that was the explicit premise of the Nonproliferation Treaty and it was a factor at least in the thinking of some of them. In other words that they might make the enormous investment in this approach only to find nuclear weapons at last effectively outlawed or you know, moved away from. So that they would no longer either need them or be able to use them from diplomacy.

1987
30 yrs.
To define the current situation in one further dimension that I haven't mentioned very much. As things are going right now there is no immediate prospect to suppose that either super power will cease violating their agreement in the Atmospheric Test Ban Treaty or the Nonproliferation Treaty to seek and achieve an end to the testing an end to the arms race and a reversal of the arms race.

Both sides have been violating those sworn treaty commitments as seriously as a treaty commitment can be violated. They've just been ignoring them. Especially one could say, the United States. I say that only because—well, we're in a situation right now for example where Reagan's breaking off with no date for returning of the comprehensive test ban negotiations for the first time of any president is simply a flat, clear violation of the highest law of the land that is a signed,

ratified treaty to pursue such an agreement. In fact to achieve it. I would say the other presidents are in hardly better position but at least they went through the motions of trying to achieve it. Reagan is in clear violation of that. That's an impeachable offense as a matter of interest if any lawyers cared about such a thing. And nobody seems to be pressing him too hard on that at the moment.

If the arms buildups proceed as now scheduled then I think that a number of countries will in fact either revoke their signatures on the Nonproliferation Treaty or a number who have never signed it which includes a number of nuclear capable countries, will at last decide the arms race is going on indefinitely and in that world we might as well have our own nuclear weapons to deter their being used against us. And so that we may reap the marginal benefits that come from having them in various kinds, including the ability to use them against those (to threaten them) against those of our neighbors and rivals who have not yet acquired them, thus imitating in particular the U.S. simply in this respect.

I would think then that the next decade, certainly generation, is going to see the significant major proliferation of nuclear weapons unless something happens fast to change this prospect. This has been threatened before. It has been warned before. It hasn't happened but there are several things that are different right now. One of those things being that the nuclear material is now widespread throughout the world. Widely available. The question was raised have we used our weapons in effect to buy various things with.

not yet — Certainly we have pressed our ability to extend "a nuclear umbrella" over allies both in Europe, Japan, and elsewhere and gained diplomatic and economic privileges and advantages by that. But a much more direct form of market may open up before very long. And that is a direct black market—covert market—in fissionable materials and quite possibly and likely eventually in finished nuclear weapons.

A major informed speculation about South Africa's pursuit of nuclear capability which it's agreed now essentially they have achieved and tested is in order to buy diplomatic support and other advantages in the world with finished nuclear weapons. A very scarce commodity. And on the other hand help for South Africa is a rather scarce commodity and they may find some advantageous trades with people in the world. Other people could do that. So weapons may actually come into direct trade before long and of course not only with other governments, but with liberation movements, with terrorist groups, with really any form of group that could afford half a ^b million dollars lets say, or less, or more.

That's the world I think in which nuclear weapons will be going off with some frequency on the terrorist basis or the small war basis. And nuclear winter will not prevent that. Nuclear winter may simply, if it works, if it works out, be the consequence of these practices eventually, when the thing does blow up.

I spent the whole first time because I tried to help understand the arms race by spelling out the incentives—the perceived advantages—which draw people into it—draw governments into it and draw them forward under certain historic and geographical and other circumstances and

sociological circumstances. But I've implied the risks a good deal. The fact that nations may back down does not mean that they will. The shortsightedness and narrow thinking, solely power-oriented thinking, solely nationalistic thinking which has been exhibited both in our country and in the Soviet Union and in other countries in the past I think, can be exhibited in other countries as well to whom we are opposed and in fact ~~in~~ in such a way that they simply fail to do what would be reasonable for them to do and that is to surrender.

The lengths to which we have been willing to risk the future—to risk the future of the arms race, to risk the future of the northern hemisphere and other... For interests that however significant might be don't seem remotely to justify risks of this sort should be a warning to us of the willingness of others to take those risks if we are capable of that minimal degree of empathy which comes let me say, as a former counter-revolutionary, and imperial agent of the U.S. government—and I say that in my own mind without any sense of rhetoric but as a simple description of what my role was in Viet Nam—but it comes very hard to people from a core metropolitan country—from a major industrial country—to have that minimal degree of empathy that other people may be as unwilling to back down, to surrender what they see or their leaders tell them ^{of} ~~of~~ their country's interests as we are. And therefore that the emperor will break its bones, break its lances.

The possibility has been underestimated I think I said in an earlier lecture, by countries of nearly every political stamp in the last generation—socialist, capitalist, fascist, Islamic fundamentalists—have

all managed to ^{over-}~~under~~rate the willingness of their opponents to back down when they ought to—when they are weaker, when they are outgunned. And thus wars have ground on which I'm saying in a few years I think are likely to be small nuclear wars in which the super powers are increasingly likely as of now (unless they change their practices) to attach their own interests and become involved.

Remember the nuclear winter hypothesis does not imply that every war must end all life or be suicidal. Again I have had these questions in mind. And the first question I was asked tonight was the difference between counterforce targeting and countercity targeting with very accurate small yield weapons there is a significant difference in hitting military targets—even near cities, or even in cities—rather than targeting the whole city with a large yield thermonuclear weapon. The people of the area can feel a great difference. In other words many of them may survive the one who would not survive the other.

But under any circumstances the likelihood that any attack on military targets will generate or will lead to a devastating genocidal suicidal attack on civilians inadvertently or eventually deliberately? This is not a certainty but it constitutes what the almost unanimous body of Catholic bishops described as an intolerable moral risk—an unacceptable moral risk. Unusual phrase since most casuistry, most discussions of ethics seem to emphasize not the choice between risks and gambles but certain intended outcomes. In this case they are facing the choice of uncertainties and they are saying that the risk of an increased risk of major city busting, of major destruction of civilian population

is too great to be justified by any interest facing any nation in the world today starting with their own—our own—United States. That no interest possessed by the United States of any sort justifies the initiation of nuclear war in any form—not because that initiation must in an incontrovertibly immoral way kill the innocent or lead to the killing of innocent, but because it is ^{too} highly likely to do so. And that that risk is unacceptable. And I agree with that position certainly. So that's the distinction then.

I think I have, whether you recognize it or not..., let me run down some of these other questions to make sure. We talked about the instability—whether that was a conscious policy or not.

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did! | Are the Marines a trip wire in Lebanon? I'm not sure, by the way, that they were put there for that purpose in this particular case. But of course now that they are they have that function. Reagan knows it and as I've suggested they are hostages, everybody in the country, everybody in the world can see. And a hostage that Reagan is not quick to remove under threat and in part because it would jeopardize the status of later trip wires. If people could understand that under a certain amount of pressure your trip wires—your hostages—would be removed quickly, or might be removed, their deterrent effect would be less. And Reagan is not the first president to rely on trip wires various places, now has to be conscious that marines who look like a trip wire or act like a trip wire cannot be withdrawn too quickly lest the same expectation is aroused for later trip wires that are meant to be trip wires. You understand.

Who asked that question? That follow? So the risk is real. Is thirty days too quick for those marines to be removed? Tomorrow we can

wake up and discover that the Iowa has been destroyed, that their troop ships have been destroyed, that another bunch of them has been destroyed. Who here in this room, who here in this country, could give us any kind of assurance that the current policies of the U.S. will prevent that from happening tomorrow. I would hope that Weinberger or Reagan would not give us any such assurance. Do we have an interest in that conflict which justifies that risk and what might lead from it? I would say certainly not. And nevertheless their perception of our interests and need for credibility is different.

How does Victory Is Possible fit into our readings? As I've said, all these presidents act as if they had read Victory Is Possible and it was their text book. That's the reason then for reading that article. It's the Mein Kampf. Sorry. I keep bringing this up. It is simply a blueprint. But now, let me correct what my little joke just now may have misled you into thinking. I am not saying—I do not believe—that is the case because they all have read it and believe it.

I am saying you will do well to bet that given decisions by any government as of now including a successor to Reagan, will follow that blueprint pretty closely unless we see some change, that's just a predictive formula. And I'll go in later lectures as best I can at this point to the question of why that is even though some presidents clearly believe I believe that that policy is wrong and unnecessary. Let me say one thing right now on that. I don't think any president has seen how dangerous it is. I would like to believe their resistance would be greater than it has been if they shared let us say my sense, for what

it's worth, and that of a lot of other people, as to just how dangerous that policy has been.

How could I explain to myself that these guys that have the best information that we can provide and who are all, you know, serious, responsible people with a good deal of talent to get where they are, could have such a different opinion from mine, let's say. A recent guess on that—simply this. The risks have I believe grown enormously greater recently. An accident of politics in part brought in a team of people with Reagan, in particular, who have held their present views for a generation in some cases, and have been very consistent about it. But who constituted a very recognizable (this included Nitze) a very recognizable minority that looked crazy—out of touch with reality seven or eight years ago.

I do not look back and see—I can't think of anyone who imagined that those people would be running our policy seven or eight years ^{ago} from now. The reason that they are is essentially their alliance with Reagan (who after all was not elected to engage in that policy particularly—he was elected for a lot of different reasons, namely to do with the economy, with dislike for Jimmy Carter for the Iranian hostage problem and possible effects on the economy and so forth) and he brought with him people who are true believers in a doctrine which had a different cast twenty years ago from what it has today.

What I am saying is that those people are now prolonging a policy which, however risky it may have been twenty years ago, however shortsighted it may have been twenty years ago, was not remotely as

183 dangerous as it has become in a world in which the Soviets have spent that twenty years building nuclear weapons—some of which are now powerful counterforce vulnerable weapons. ~~Not as dangerous~~ as if the Soviets had built more submarines—and they have. I mean it wouldn't be as dangerous. It wouldn't be as dangerous if the Soviets had not pursued our accuracy—as they have. It certainly wouldn't be as dangerous if we had had a test ban at almost any point during that period—as we almost surely could have had if a president had wanted it. But it is that dangerous now, it has become vastly dangerous. So much so that I would say to pursue these types of advantages, these types of interests...

I'll put it another way.

To maintain a sense of U.S. vital interests that encourages us and commits us to rely on military force in the world of the 1980s and the way that we are is as close to clinical insanity as any ruling group has ever been in probably the history of the world. Now they are not clinically insane. Take them individually and some of them may sound strange or a little unusual;??? leaders tend to be actually when looked up close. I don't think they are that different from the past. So the explanation forms another problem.

I think the problem is of explaining. I think the explanation lies somewhat in the fact that it took not ten years, it took about 45 years now of history, starting with the Second World War, that's why I went into that history. A history of certain kinds of asymmetries in the world, certain kinds of opportunities, to give this country a group of officials, supported by the media, supported by most academics, supported

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by a massive concensus in the country, shaped by ignorance, shaped by the classification rules, shaped by false information over thirty years, which supports policies which are at this point, grossly out of touch with the realities of the world, grossly anachronistic, and constitute risks to humanity and ourselves that have simply never been posed or accepted by any leaders in the history of the world.

This year, by the way, the same could be said of the Soviet leaders at this point. The choices they have been making I think are as wildly mistaken and by the way I have a feeling are rather strongly similar to the kinds of decisions we have been making. I would guess that a reason for the Soviet SS-18 accuracy—I have described one reason which is to pose the same kind of threats we have. But why? Probably not for crises. Probably a sense all the Americans understand is strength. All the Americans understand is threat—is force. They don't come to the bargaining table unless we have a weapon that makes them nervous. A lot of evidence for that. They have as good a case for that approach as we do. And we have some case for it too. They have a better case if anything—the way things have gone. I'll explain that a little. I don't think it's smart for them to be acting on that case. I don't think it's any smarter for them to think that they are going to push us around with the bargaining chip threats than we are they. That we're going to do it to them. So the two sides are interacting in a way that is extremely ominous for the future.

Can anything be done about this? Well, reelecting (another question here) simply reelecting another president—even one pledged to change

1984 this, who is chosen to pledge to change it—as was suggested by the question, "What can the president do? Can he control it?" is definitely not enough by itself I would say. Jimmy Carter not only promised to move the world in the direction of the abolition of nuclear weapons. By all evidence known to me he meant that and intended to do it. But that's not the way he went when he got in. If Mondale, his vice president, made the same promises now (and interestingly he isn't going that far) that by itself would be no more reason to believe we would have changed the policy than in the case of Carter.

What then is possible? We only have a few minutes left at this point in this lecture so fortunately we have a couple more lectures to address this. But I'll say some things now which I'll want to say no doubt in other occasions later when more people are here. Because these are things that everybody needs to hear I think.

The description I gave of the motives that drove the U.S. as I can make them out and certainly drove let's say, Nitze (who has been around for a long time) do imply an asymmetry in the strategic objectives of these two powers. Obviously Nitze and others and most Americans see an evident and unequivocal moral asymmetry in the operations of the two powers.

CHANGE TAPE SIDE

the side at this late date for the moment. Certainly in my own feeling and that, no doubt, of nearly everyone here is that there is an enormous

asymmetry in the domestic government of these two powers. And entirely, I would say in my opinion, in our favor. Both as a model to others, a way to be governed.

However, the implication of Nitze's analysis and for that matter, Colin ^{Gray} Gray's analysis (especially Nitze) is that there is also an asymmetry in the reliance of these two powers on the use of the threat of first use of nuclear weapons. To police their respective spheres. I'm putting aside now the question of what right each side has to have a sphere, or police that sphere and simply looking at the imperial operations that are involved in an imperial and a technical sense—the operations which are involved in assuring that the policies and regimes of these respective small countries are in accord with the perceived interests and self interests of the larger power—super power. These are operations then that limit—circumscribe—this self determination of these smaller powers.

It's the U.S. whose sphere is so far flung, whose sense of a vital interest is so far flung as to cause it to have a compelling sense that it must rely on the threat of nuclear weapons. And as I'm saying, every president who accepts this sphere since—and that's every president we've had—the sense that he's a guardian of arrangements as they are—a status quo—more or less as it is, political and economic, within that sphere, has had occasion to discover that he could not do the job without at least calling on the threat of nuclear weapons in some circumstances. So he has been recruited into that point of view at some time during his term—whether or not he is fully converted to it later or whether it takes.

No analysis known to me (including very right wing analyses) suggests the Soviet Union has ever had or sought a similar dependence on the threat of nuclear weapons to preserve the status quo in its own sphere, either in the Soviet Union or in East Europe or in Afghanistan or elsewhere. In other words, virtually all these analyses indicate that the Soviet Union as they say could live and maintain their current imperial sway without relying on a credible threat of initiating nuclear war. ^{just} They are buying capabilities of the kind we have now which in some cases are relevant only for first use. They have not (although they have renounced, by the way, first use formally) they haven't actually gone to the point unilaterally of getting rid of weapons that have very little purpose other than first use.

There's at least two possibilities that could lead to this. One is that they have become or have decided that they wish to use the instrument of a first-use threat as the U.S. has done. They are committed to that and they are as committed as the U.S. is. Not clear why they would go in that direction or why they are compelled to do it. But one can't at this moment rule that out. Even though they say the opposite.

The other possibility is that the current Soviet attitude is "If the arms race continues, we will not let you wield a functional threat that we don't have. We won't let you have the functional capability or technical capability that we don't have. We will match you—not only in hardware, we will match you in threats. And one could imagine why they would do that. The reason I just suggested. That's the only way to get

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the U.S. to make a bargain and deal. I think it's a very dangerous way for them to be doing. That's what they could be doing.

That would be compatible with their being willing to end the process bilaterally. That's what they say they are willing to do. The Soviets have said repeatedly now that they would like to see a freeze of nuclear weapons in the sense, not that nuclear weapons remain at present levels indefinitely. I know of no advocate of a freeze, East or West, who regards that as a desirable or acceptable state of affairs. Reagan's implication, and that of many people, that a freeze is either a unilateral halt by the U.S. or is a bilaterally freezing at the current levels indefinitely is a simple misrepresentation of the position of every member of the freeze movement known to me. So the freeze is regarded as at most a first step toward reductions but the essence of it is that it says, "No more." It is agreement bilaterally that neither side will test or deploy or produce new weapons. So the reductions are from current levels. They are not reductions that are accompanied by increases in other dimensions. That is the difference.

The freeze movement I have to say has led into this confusion a good deal itself. The word "freeze" does have an ambiguity about it. That they haven't dispelled totally, that looks as though things are frozen and give it a little... And there's been a lot of talk about freeze first, reduce later or reduce first and freeze later that is rather confusing to the public. So that it is easy to miss the point that what is in fact being proposed by the freeze movement and not by the administration is that both sides agree that there will be no more

nuclear weapons. That would be a proposal by the U.S. that no president has made. Johnson said something like it in '64 of partial freeze at a time when we had a vast superiority. He made that proposal just a little late. It was just after Brezhnev had come in on a commitment not to freeze at that level but to achieve parity essentially, which he proceeded to do.

Since then the proposal has never been made to stop the arms race. I'm not really going to go into all the questions of how we might bring it about, I'll just fill in the gap. The first step of where an alternative direction to the present one might be. What would that be?

One component would be for the United States to propose a bilateral verifiable freeze as I've said. But let me be a little more specific. A proposal that is coming up rather shortly I think from Kennedy and Hatfield which I feel very favorable toward which the freeze movement has essentially adopted as an immediate program. That is to propose that those measures that can now be adequately monitored by both sides by national means by the use of their nationally controlled reconnaissance satellites, electronic satellites, electronic information satellites, infra red satellites of various kinds, radars, communication intercepts, a number of means of that sort, weapons that can be adequately verified and monitored as to whether they are being built or not by such national means should be frozen immediately in their testing and their deployment. This would include at a minimum all testing of nuclear warheads. The only controversy that could arise is extremely small explosions of less than three or four kilotons and there is not much

controversy about even that. The current Threshold Treaty which we have not ratified is 150 kilotons. In fact, since the late '60s there has been a wide consensus that it is possible to monitor explosions down to extremely low levels with high accuracy. Flight testing of ballistic missiles can be monitored by either side by radar and satellites with much greater confidence—with really close to 100 percent confidence that they will be detected. So that if either side cheated the other side would know it.

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An agreement to halt then the testing immediately of nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles would require no further negotiations on new measures of verification to verify it. It so happens that the Soviets have proposed such a moratorium—Brezhnev did—not at the most auspicious moment. That was presented to the U.N. in the height of the Korean airliner shootdown controversy. And even so one might have hoped that this proposal would make it into some American newspaper but it didn't. In fact I heard a reference to it on television that led me to investigate from the U.N. what the proposal was exactly. And I managed to find out what it was.

I didn't find a single American newspaper that mentioned that the Soviet Union had proposed an immediate moratorium at the onset of negotiations—not after lengthy negotiations—on the testing of ballistic missiles and the testing of warheads. The president, by either accepting such a proposal, or they'd be happier, by making such a proposal with the reason to hope that the Soviets who had made the proposal themselves would accept it, could end the greater part of the arms race in the space

of a phone call by saying, "We will not test warheads or ballistic missiles unless you do," after a certain date, let's say—30 days from now or something. If accepted by the other side the major part of the arms race would be flat over. And as I say that could have been done with adequate verification any time since at least the late 60s, and with a little less confidence on the warhead testing side for the early 60s, and with very high confidence on the ballistic missile side throughout this period. Had it been done any previous year starting let's say in '58 we would be facing essentially the Soviet inventories that existed then—or something close to it.

When Krushchev proposed this in '58 in other words if we had accepted a comprehensive test ban then the Soviets would have no ICBMs whatever. By ^{'59}'62 they probably had some under design. If we got it in '62 or '63 they probably would have had somewhat more than the ones they had at that point. They had about 60 under construction. They probably would have built more. We'd be looking at 100 or 200 missiles instead of 1,400. If we had had it by '68 before the ^{MIRV}Merve testing by this side—the multiple warhead—we'd be facing 1,400 warheads on those missiles instead of the 4 to 5 thousand that we are actually facing right now and our own missiles would not be vulnerable, nor would theirs. So the situation would be much more stable.

There comes a point when it's too late for this process to achieve or to produce stability. Five years from now stopping the process would still be worthwhile, but if a crisis occurred with the balance it would still occur in a world of highly unstable forces. Even a few years from

now if this process is does not extend to Cruise missiles (and that does take negotiation probably on verification measures) verification will be so close to impossible with thousands of Cruise missiles on both sides it is easily conceivable as the end of the possibility of verifiable arms control.

There are people in the Committee for Present Danger, and this administration is full of them, who believe sincerely and patriotically in their hearts that in a dangerous world the best available source of security for the United States is in an untrammelled, unconstrained, two-sided arms race in which we pursue and use our technological superiority. They are as entitled to that position as anyone else in any position. They can argue for it with some basis a good deal that nothing else is as good as that—everything else is more dangerous. I think they are tragically wrong and either way the world is being bet on that belief. One or the other.

I think it is not very responsible for any citizens of any country now including the southern hemisphere—now that we know that they are threatened by nuclear winter—to stand aside and rely on the experts. The Russian experts who did not resist the move into Afghanistan or the development of accuracy over there. The Soviet experts... the U.S. experts who gave us Viet Nam and Lebanon and the MX and the Minuteman and so forth and say they've got the information, let them make the judgments, let's bet our children's future on their wisdom. It's really not responsible to do that.

I heard at lunch today from a Dante scholar that in Dante's Inferno there is an anti^e-hell, an anti^e-chamber to hell reserved for those who

stood aside and did not take a choice. They neither were rebellious in heaven, nor were they faithful. And they are in the anti^e-chamber pursued endlessly by bees that sting them and wasps and ants that drink their tears and various other things that Orange County jail has not yet thought of, because their presence in hell would give the other members of hell the satisfaction of looking down on them. And they are, needless to say, unfit for heaven. And so a special fate is for them. It was of them that Dante, visiting this area said, "So many. I had not thought death had undone so many." Well, life has undone a lot of people so far like that.

Brent Scowcroft who was just here at the Wincon Conference... I am *not* sure that I have met him. Tom Schelling who knows him well, admires him a lot, is almost certainly correct in saying "Brent Scowcroft," (I am sure he said, "loathes the MX." Knows that it is not necessary. Knows that whatever advantages can be got from it are neither worth the cost nor the risk. Knows that the risks are great. Knows that the MX should not be built—above all in fixed silos which was the decision of his boss, the president. But he sold the MX to Congress and to the President on the grounds that it should be accompanied by a more stable missile, the Midgetman missile. We are to keep testing going so as to develop warheads for this new stable missile (and for the MX) so that we can have both. *Gore!*

I won't go into it. We are past the time now. I'll just say something that I said when I...why I guess I was in jail last week. I was asked simply to be in a press conference for this Wincon Conference

for the Wincon Action—Winter Conference of the Aerospace Committee—by some people... (Are they here tonight?) And I told them my engagements were such I expected to be in Washington. I didn't think I would take part in the action. And it used to be that I never would take part in publicity or encouraging people to take part in an action that I was not going to be part of myself for what may be obvious reasons. And it's a matter of asking a person to take risks of various kinds for very little prospect of any influence. And you don't know where the risks are, a little incalculable up to a point. Depends on what judge you get and the circumstances of the moment. And that chance of a six month jail sentence or more is always there. And so I don't lightly counsel anybody to take that and I used to say I wouldn't ever do it unless I was going to do it myself.

Well I've done a lot of actions in the last two years and I do enough of them. I obviously can't do them all any more than anybody can. So, and I believe in them in general. So I do allow myself now sometimes here I'm in the area to speak in favor of the principle and in favor of the action even if I don't expect to do it myself. But I found myself looking at the schedule of this conference which included Brent Scowcroft and another man from UC, Herb York, who was taking part in a classified briefing to the air force people and the aerospace industry people from Northrup and elsewhere who are selling each other on the necessity for these weapons.

And again, as I say, without knowing Scowcroft I know enough of his friends to know that he's the kind of person I would have worked with and

no doubt respected him as much as Schelling did or anyone else. And he has made the choice that was suggested over here, not to throw away his access, not to throw away his influence, not to throw away his ability to speak to audiences with the position of a consultant to the president and members still in good standing or former members still in good standing of the National Security Council. To give his advice from within. To pay the price for doing that. Which involves, by the way, saying things in secret to these audiences that are not available to the American public but more involved saying things to the President that he wouldn't say to Congress. That's the opportunity he gets. And why throw that away. Surely influence as great as possible.

Evidently he hasn't learned something that I think I have learned now in which I would say McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, Ken ^{new} and the others in coming out for no-first-use which they believed in for twenty years, have learned, not too late, I hope. And that was that there was something about our society that kept presidents in line, whatever thoughts they came in with (the office). And therefore, if you knew the president was wrong in this respect and the policy was wrong you should question whether you could best use that knowledge and that information in your own experience simply by advising the president and paying the price of access to the president, which is a willingness to lie to the public in important matters for the president. And a reason you shouldn't do that was that there were other forms of power than presidential power and in fact the president didn't have much power in certain situations for changing.

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I concluded from reading the Pentagon Papers that no president had felt the power to get us out of Vietnam any more than Reagan at this moment I think has a sense of power that it is easy for him to get the Marines out of Lebanon. And he hasn't managed to do it yet. And I'm not sure that he is terribly happy about their being there. I hoped that the American system, unlike the Russian, allowed power to emerge outside the executive branch and to shape the executive branch in new ways. If you organize people in new ways, and people acted on their numbers and convictions with conscience and commitment in ways that would counterbalance the pressures that were currently keeping the presidents in line. That was a hope that I had. And my hope was that information might do it. That you didn't perhaps have to change the basic values and identity and loyalties of the American public. Because if that's what it took it might be just as hard to do that as to change the whole system of government in Russia—which is to say you know, a glacial rate of change. But that it might be possible that secrecy was critical to what they were doing. The classified sessions, the lying to the public, might have been necessary to keep this policy on track. I'm talking now about the Vietnam policy. It was a conclusion I reached and I hoped as I may have mentioned to you before, that if the American people had information about how much they were being lied to and what the policy really was they would decide that that's not what they had voted for, and not what they wanted, and they were determined to change it. That they would even discover that voting wasn't enough although it's necessary—it's essential.

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But that there were other processes that had been found necessary to bring about every major social change in this country from the unionization of workers and change in women's voting, civil rights—I could mention a lot of others—that had called for a great variety of measures including demonstrations, including referenda, including petitions, and definitely including campaigns and electoral activity as crucial, but not alone, and including nonviolent civil disobedience. All of those movements that I've spoken of did include as an element nonviolent civil disobedience. More or less invented on a mass scale, well by Ghandi and in western countries and this country—an industrial country—none of which have brought about massive radical changes in our class structure or our foreign policy or anything else, but they have brought about change that I think would not have come about otherwise. And specifically the nonviolent civil disobedience was part of a movement—I think a necessary part of a movement—that in turn was necessary to end the bombing of Vietnam against the will of the president. And which did do that. Which demonstrated that there is popular power in this country if there's enough information, enough commitment, enough organization, and enough courage.

So I'm carrying you past the time here. I'll just say what I said at the Wincon Meeting—at the press conference. I said, "Actions like this have the chance to set an example of courage. And it takes courage for people to risk their careers in the government, their relations to their party leaders, or their president in Congress, to follow their conscience—to do what they already know is the right course of action.

But to act on it in disobedience to—in resistance to—a president. We don't have a formal Fuhrer principle—leader principle—an oath to the commander, either in civil or for that matter, military life in this country that existed in Germany and elsewhere.

But people in this country (like every other country) feel a very, very strong reluctance to disobey the national leader, to resist him openly, or to isolate themselves from the community which that involves—whatever they think about the leader. They pay a price of separation and isolation. It takes imagination to do that. It takes an example, I would say, of somebody else doing it to cause you to do that. And it takes an example of courage." And I said, "This courage is contagious and that's why I'm glad people in Orange County are changing the pattern of their own lives—breaking the business-as-usual pattern in their own lives—in order to get in the way of the businessmen and the military men who are doing business-as-usual in this Wincon Conference."

Pursuing the policies which were set down years and generations ago and which they are now pursuing in an age when those policies have become radically dangerous. And they are still doing it. And somebody has got to give them pause. And maybe some bodies lying in the way of their buses—giving pause to the buses—will have the effect on them that similar actions had on me when I was in the same position as a Scowcroft or one of these others.

And that's not to give myself airs, I was pretty much at that level. I wasn't the National Security Advisor but I moved in that circle. "I know," I said, "that such actions have power. Not that any individual

one has any guarantee or any likelihood of being very effective but I know that they can be powerful because I have felt that power on my own life. It changed my life. I wouldn't have thought of doing something which could have sent me to jail for 115 years (which was the sentence that was posed to me for giving the Pentagon Papers)."

Just by demonstrations and electoral activity alone, important as that was, it took people who were choosing to go to jail to put it to me that this is a risk I ought to be willing to take. As I looked down at the name Brent Scowcroft I felt sure, that man knows that the MX should not be bought. Is he going to tell this group of people that? Herb York knows it too. I don't know what he said.

I'd like to believe—I'd almost rather not ask—that he used his time at that classified briefing to say, "Not one of the weapons being discussed at this conference should be bought by the United States. Every one of them is wasteful. Every one of them is unnecessary and most of them greatly increase the risk of annihilation of this country." I am certain that Herb York, Professor of this University, believes that and knows that. And he is right. I hope he said that.

But there would be a price to his doing it. I am sorry to say I am not certain that he chose to pay that price on this occasion. I feel pretty certain that Brent Scowcroft (who has made his position clear, as to where his loyalties lie) and they do lie overwhelmingly to the leader in this case... And I won't say that's unAmerican as I've been accused of being. Because there's ways of being an American. But I will say that my basic allegiance is to those things that are most peculiarly

American—most distinctively American—that differentiate us in being good Americans from the meaning of being a good German or a good Russians. Their principles of polity are different from ours.

And what is most distinctive about this country is that you can be a good American by telling the president that he is wrong when you know that he is wrong and by exposing that. That is a way of being a good American that does not formally and in principle exist for the citizens of most other countries. What Brent Scowcroft should have said is what he knows, and what I am sure he did not say. The MX is a catastrophe for this country. Buying the Midgetman with it in no way compensates for the increased dangers of adding the MX to our... It merely to a slight degree attenuates them.

To keep the arms race going—to have a single warhead Midgetman missile—is an absolute mockery of an approach toward stabilization. It increases the risks of this world. And the only way you could be for it is by admitting to yourself that the alternative by this president is something still more dangerous. And if that's what you believe you should tell the public that that's the man they are voting for or against in this election.

So I looked at Brent Scowcroft and I felt ashamed for him. For my past colleagues. For my own past life. Ashamed that I had looked up to and respected people who were not capable, yet, of doing that. But being a human, as well as American, he's capable of changing. I know that. Because I went through years when I no more told what I knew to be the truth about the risk we were running in Vietnam to the public than Brent

Scowcroft did. And I don't act as a matter of fact out of guilt, I don't think. To think—many people suppose that—does not correspond to my own understanding of myself.

I just learned that there was a better way to act. And I learned it from people as young as the youngest people here, who put it to me that in that war (which we are getting ready to rerun in Central America and Lebanon) in Vietnam was a time when the best place for them to be was in jail—in order that people like Brent Scowcroft and me might possibly get the message that they could use their experience better than lying for the President. So I did learn it. And when it turned out that I had the time to take part in this little action last week that I had encouraged people to do, I felt an obligation to pass on what I had learned from other people; in hopes that if Brent Scowcroft doesn't get the message or Herb York doesn't get the message, somebody in this room will get it and will waste less of their lives than I did.

Thank you.